



NIO # 672-74

Office of the Director
of Central Intelligence



DATE: 5 April 1974

TO: The Director

SUBJECT:

Attached is a note I am sending to Vince de Poix which should be self-explanatory. The project in question is the brainchild of my two Middle East colleagues, [redacted] who have, I think, identified a real need.

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I am sending copies to the people indicated below but, per my commitment to Vince, will not initiate formal action until his thoughts and suggestions are received.



George A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO

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cc: DCI
DDCI
A/DDI
D/OSR
DDO
C/NE

MORI/CDF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

5 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix, USN
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Proposed National Intelligence
Analytical Memorandum Assessing
the Arab-Israeli Military
Balance

1. Recent informal discussions with colleagues and policy-level consumers in State, Defense and the NSC Staff -- not to mention the current Congressional dialogue -- all suggest that a basic, in-depth assessment of the post-October 1973 war military situation in the Middle East would make a significant and helpful contribution to the national decision-making process. Moreover, the Intelligence Community itself would probably benefit from such an effort which, if properly done, would sharpen and improve our analysis of the key factors in the current Middle East military situation. The last such overall assessment was done in 1970 and, as is virtually self-evident, 1970's judgments in this sphere should not be used as 1974's assumption.

2. The purpose of such a study would be to evaluate the relative combat capabilities of the Arab and Israeli military forces under various hypothetical but realistic conflict scenarios with a view toward providing a series of basic analytical judgments that would be helpful to our decision-making consumers. Any such study obviously should be reviewed by the USIB. The National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum (NIAM) would appear to be

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the most appropriate format. Whatever format be chosen, the study should be structured to facilitate its being re-evaluated in whole or in part on a periodic basis.

3. Clearly any effort of this magnitude will have to be a Community endeavor drawing on the combined and coordinated resources of all of the Community's components. Given the subject in question, however, a large share of the burden would fall either directly on DIA or on components of the military intelligence fraternity tasked through DIA. For this reason, I wanted to broach this idea informally to you before proceeding any further. I had meant to speak to you at the close of the 4 April USIB meeting but unfortunately had to leave before the meeting ended -- hence, this memorandum. To my mind, the overall project should be conducted under the chairmanship of the NIO for the Middle East. In my view, the bulk of the drafting should logically be done in DIA -- provided, of course, that you agree and are willing for DIA to take on this task. As you know from our previous conversations and correspondence, I am indifferent to whether we call this providing drafters or drafts, so long as we both agree that the drafts -- however produced -- are not to be viewed as institutional properties or products (i.e., in the sense of making institutional commitments or voting institutional stock). Actually, in this project there would almost certainly have to be several interagency research groups all operating under the NIO's aegis in support of the drafting team.

4. Attached as a stimulus to further discussion is a suggested topical outline of the NIAM envisaged. If you concur, we should probably try to develop the project along the lines indicated under the following schedule:

Drafter named and Community support coordinated	25 April
Draft paper circulated to CIA, DIA, INR	7 June
Representatives meetings	1 July
Paper completed	1 August

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5. During June -- i.e., after the draft is finished and before the representatives meetings begin -- it would probably be useful for the principal drafter(s) and the NIO to visit key Middle East posts to discuss the draft with knowledgeable U.S. intelligence officials on the scene (e.g., the Defense Attaches) to get their views and be sure the paper reflects the real world as seen by those who live in it.

6. I would welcome receiving your personal reactions to these ideas. I want to be sure you and I are in complete accord before any formal action is taken to set such a project in train.



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George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

O/D/DCI/NIO:GACarver/mee

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Outline

I. Background

A concise account of the differences between the October War and the three earlier wars. This should outline the scope of the separate campaigns in each war and use comparative figures to illustrate the growing scale of conflict and personnel and equipment losses.

II. Ground Forces

- Trends in organizational development
- Quantitative and qualitative changes in equipment
- Quality and availability of manpower
- Broad judgments on relative effectiveness and capabilities of ground forces
- Dependence upon foreign advisors and technical support

III. Naval Forces

- Minimum role in recent conflicts
- Trends in organizations and equipment
- Dependence on foreign advisors and technical support
- Broad judgments on relative effectiveness and capabilities of naval forces

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IV. Air Forces and Air Defenses

- Air power has been decisive in past
- Growing importance and implications of air defense
- Trends in organizational development
- Quantitative and qualitative changes in equipment
- Dependence upon foreign advisors and technical support
- Broad judgments on relative effectiveness and capabilities of air forces

V. Foreign Military Assistance

- Dimensions of foreign assistance
- Types of assistance, i.e. credits, arms, production facilities
- Trends

VI. Logistics Capabilities and Limitations

- Reference to section on foreign assistance
- Estimate of war reserve stocks of essential items
- Discussion of internal transportation capabilities
- Maintenance and technical capabilities
- Assessment of overall logistics capabilities under selected scenarios

VII. Conflict Scenarios

- Review range of possibilities
- Select most probable scenarios
- Outline opposing forces in most likely scenarios
- Relate previous judgments of logistics capabilities and force effectiveness to likely scenarios
- Broad judgments on personnel and equipment attrition in selected scenarios
- Identify approximate period of time opposing forces could continue to fight without resupply from foreign sources

VIII. Annexes to Support Conflict Scenarios

- A. Strength and disposition of ground forces: tables with major items of equipment; tables on divisions, brigades, and separate battalions; maps showing disposition of major units.
- B. Strength and disposition of naval forces: tables with major ships tabulated, maps showing disposition and operating areas.
- C. Strength and disposition of air forces: tables with aircraft inventories, tables on aircraft ratios, pilot/aircraft ratios, sortie capabilities, maps showing locations of squadrons and major airfields, tables and maps to illustrate range limitation.

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